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A B S T R A C T
Existing evidence shows that R&D tax incentives boost countries’ private sector R&D. Given the importance of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) for private sector innovation, it is unclear, however, whether firms engage
in genuinely new R&D or whether R&D is reallocated across borders. Drawing on data on unconsolidated R&D
activity of MNEs in Europe, we provide evidence that responses are dominated by cross-border relocations:
More generous tax incentives in one country increase MNEs’ R&D investments in affiliates located there, while
lowering R&D investments in affiliates of the same MNE group located in other countries. Globally, firms
hardly raise their R&D activities when tax incentives become more generous.1. Introduction
Recent years have seen an unprecedented increase in the prevalence
and generosity of tax incentives for research and development (R&D).
Today, 30 out of the 36 OECD countries offer preferential tax treat-
ment for R&D expenditure, while less than half of these countries had
implemented R&D tax incentive schemes 25 years ago (OECD, 2017).
The U.S. currently spends almost $11.7 billion on R&D tax support,
France and the UK around $6.7 billion and $3.8 billion, respectively
(see OECD, 2019a,b,c). Several countries without R&D tax incentive
schemes debate their introduction.
Theory suggests that granting R&D tax subsidies to private sector
firms internalizes positive externalities of corporate R&D and increases
inefficiently low R&D investment levels (Arrow, 1962; Hall and Van
Reenen, 2000). In line with this notion, evidence shows that the so-
cial returns to R&D investments outweigh their private returns (see
e.g., Hall et al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2013) and that countries can
increase R&D activity within their borders by lowering R&D tax costs
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(see the literature review below). Despite the growing globalization of
corporate R&D (Florida, 1997), surprisingly little is known about the
cross-border effects of R&D tax incentives. In this paper, we fill this gap
and assess whether changes of R&D tax incentives in one country do
not only impact R&D investment there but also affect R&D activity in
other jurisdictions. To this end, we make use of rich micro-level panel
data on R&D activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
From a theoretical perspective, there are various ways in which R&D
tax incentives may generate cross-border effects. On the one hand, R&D
is internationally mobile (e.g., Abramovsky et al., 2008) and expanded
R&D tax incentives at one MNE location might attract investments
from abroad and lower R&D activity at entities of the same MNE in
other locations. Global investment responses are then smaller than
investment responses in the policy-changing country because of a cross-
border substitution effect. On the other hand, if R&D production chains
span several MNE locations, investments at different locations might
also be complements. Expanded R&D tax support would then increasevailable online 28 July 2021
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foreign R&D activity and trigger global investment responses that ex-
ceed the responses in the policy-changing jurisdiction. As MNEs ac-
count for a substantial share of private innovation investment (e.g., see
Criscuolo et al., 2010; National Science Board, 2014; Bilir and Morales,
2020), cross-border relocation of R&D for tax purposes may be a
significant driver of aggregate R&D investment patterns. 1
To empirically identify the sign and size of the cross-border effect
of R&D tax incentives, we analyze panel data on European MNEs. Our
empirical analysis spans the years 2000 to 2012 and measures uncon-
solidated innovative activity of MNEs by the number of granted patents
filed at MNE group locations and invented locally.2 The innovativeness
of technologies varies across patents (see e.g., Hall et al., 2010) and
plausibly reflects variation in the size of the underlying R&D activity.
Hence, we construct our R&D measure as a quality-adjusted count of
granted patent applications (where quality differences are modeled
by patents’ family size, forward citations and the number of industry
classes on the patent). This data is linked to information on tax costs
related to corporate R&D investments in each location of the MNE as
measured by the B-index (McFetridge and Warda, 1983).
We estimate fixed effects Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) models that express the number of quality-adjusted patents per
MNE group location and year as a function of the host country’s B-index
and the average B-index at other locations of the same MNE group.
The models condition on a rich set of control variables that absorb
observed and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across firms and
host countries. In line with prior studies, we find that lower R&D
tax costs positively impact corporate R&D investments in the policy-
changing country. The estimated elasticity of R&D output with respect
to the B-index is −1.02 and hence in the range of prior estimates in
the domestic context (see e.g., the literature review in Guceri and Liu,
2019).3 The analysis points to a positive and statistically significant
cross-border relocation effect: Lower R&D tax costs at one group
location are associated with diminished R&D investments at entities
in other locations that belong to the same MNE group. In absolute
terms, the estimated cross-border and host country tax effects do not
differ, implying that we cannot reject that the aggregate tax elasticity
– i.e., the sum of the host country tax effect and the cross-country tax
effect – is zero. On average, R&D tax incentives are hence suggested to
serve as beggar-thy-neighbor instruments rather than policies to expand
the global R&D investment of MNEs.
The estimated cross-country tax effect prevails in specifications
where we augment the vector of regressors by country-year-fixed effects
and hence compare changes in the R&D activity of affiliates of different
MNE groups in the same country that do and do not experience tax
cost shocks at other locations of the MNE group (or experience shocks
of different size). The estimates are also robust to augmenting the
model by subnational-region-year-fixed effects and industry-year-fixed
effects respectively and to controlling for economic and technological
changes at the host locations of other MNE affiliates. Furthermore, we
complement the analysis by estimating distributed lag models. In line
with intuition, the results indicate that responses of corporate R&D
activity, as measured by granted patent applications, emerge with a
time lag. The estimates also support the common trend assumption:
Group locations that do and do not experience changes in foreign
entities’ R&D tax environments exhibit similar R&D trends prior to the
1 According to National Science Board (2014), MNEs performed around
0% of the overall U.S. business R&D in 2010.
2 Patent counts at the location of the technology inventor(s) are a widely
sed proxy for R&D investment (see Section 4 for details). Note that papers on
orporate patent shifting, in contrast, study (tax) determinants of the location
f patent ownership, conditional on the inventor location (e.g., Alstadsæter
t al., 2018).
3 We also show that omitting the foreign tax costs regressor biases the
stimate for the host country tax coefficient — albeit in a quantitatively2
oderate way.reform. Placebo tests, where we reestimate our empirical model after
randomly reassigning group structures across MNE affiliates, yield no
significant cross-border relocation effect.
Finally, we present evidence for effect heterogeneity. Our results
suggest that the size of the cross-country R&D tax effect is larger for
low-distance firms than for high-distance firms. This finding is consis-
tent with the notion that firms have regional R&D location preferences
or that transaction costs increase in geographic distance. Our findings
hence lend some support to prior macro-level studies which assume that
cross-border tax effects decline in space (e.g., Wilson, 2009; Akcigit
et al., 2018).4 On top of that, we show that MNEs with large R&D
activities tend to respond stronger to changes in R&D tax incentives
than smaller MNEs. This potentially reflects that benefits from R&D tax
planning increase in firm size, while implementation costs tend to be
fixed.
Our paper relates to a growing empirical literature that estimates
the impact of R&D tax subsidies on corporate R&D investment. The
large majority of studies is concerned with determining the effect of
host country R&D tax cost on R&D investments. This informs policymak-
ers on how adjustments of R&D tax incentives affect R&D activity in
their own country, ignoring contemporary tax policy measures in other
countries. The literature relies on aggregate information on R&D spend-
ing at the country or state level (see e.g., Bloom et al., 2002; Athukorala
and Kohpaiboon, 2010; Moretti and Wilson, 2017; Brown et al., 2017),
R&D information drawn from firm surveys (e.g., Czarnitzki et al.,
2011; Cappelen et al., 2012; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2013; Mulkay
and Mairesse, 2013), annual reports of listed firms (e.g. Yang et al.,
2012; Ivus et al., 2021) and, more recently, also administrative corpo-
rate tax return data (e.g., Rao, 2016; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2017; Guceri
and Liu, 2019; Agrawal et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2021) to quantify
this effect. As the latter studies commonly draw on data for individual
countries, cross-border relocation of R&D for tax purposes can, by
definition, not be assessed.5
Evaluations of the economic and welfare consequences of R&D tax
incentives, nevertheless, require a thorough understanding of their im-
pact across borders. If more generous R&D tax incentives – as suggested
by our findings – do attract mobile R&D from abroad, neighboring
countries suffer a loss in R&D activity. The global response of R&D in-
vestment is then smaller than the R&D response in the policy-changing
country. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present
micro-level evidence on the cross-border impact of input-related R&D
tax incentives in a large number of countries. Our analysis relates to
early work by Hines (1995) and Hines and Jaffe (2001) who study the
effect of the international tax system (i.e., withholding taxes on royalty
payments and the interaction of U.S. foreign tax credits with domestic
tax incentives) on the R&D activity of a limited number of U.S. MNEs.6
Beyond these contributions, there are few prior studies that consider
4 Note that our binary measure of intra-firm distance cannot speak on the
unctional form of the relationship between effect size and absolute distance
etween alternative locations.
5 This is acknowledged as a shortcoming in prior work, see e.g., Guceri
and Liu (2019). Note, moreover, that analogous to the cited research, we
focus on input-related R&D tax incentives, e.g., incentives granted in the form
of special tax deductions for R&D costs or R&D tax credits. Output-related
incentives, namely special low tax rates on patent income (patent boxes), are
disregarded as they tend to be instruments to attract mobile profits rather than
to spur R&D investment (see e.g., Bösenberg and Egger, 2017; Alstadsæter
et al., 2018; Koethenbuerger et al., 2018; Knoll and Riedel, 2019 and Gaessler
et al., 2021). In general, empirical studies on patent boxes also largely ignore
cross-country effects. An exception is Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2021) who
show that profit shifting opportunities and tax cost reductions related to patent
box regimes spur R&D investments in non-patent box countries.
6 Using data aggregated at 42 foreign subsidiary locations, they find substi-
tution effects, while a first-difference analysis of patenting data from 378 U.S.
firms reveals complementary effects.




















cross-border effects of R&D taxation on foreign country R&D — and
all of these studies are based on aggregate data. Bloom and Griffith
(2001) and Montmartin and Herrera (2015) use information on private
sector R&D spending in individual OECD countries, Wilson (2009) uses
data on corporate R&D spending in U.S. states between 1981 and 2004,
and Akcigit et al. (2018) use historic data on patent filings in U.S.
counties and states during the 20th century.
The results in these papers are mixed: Bloom and Griffith (2001),
Wilson (2009) and Montmartin and Herrera (2015) find large and
positive cross-border effects of R&D tax costs on other jurisdictions’
R&D activity. Akcigit et al. (2018) report a positive but more moderate
tax impact. For corporate R&D, proxied by corporate patents, the latter
study even fails to find any indication of cross-border relocation of
R&D for tax purposes. These contrasting findings might, in part, be
attributed to differences in the modeling approaches pursued. In par-
ticular, testing for cross-border spillovers requires making assumptions
on where tax spillovers arise. Prior studies assume that they emerge in
border counties of reform states (Akcigit et al., 2018), in adjacent or
geographically close states (Wilson, 2009), or economically connected
jurisdictions as measured by FDI flows (Bloom and Griffith, 2001) or
international trade (Montmartin and Herrera, 2015). With micro-level
data, as the one used in our study, spillover routes at the group-level
can be identified explicitly in a non-adhoc way based on information on
MNE group structures. Micro-level data, moreover, allows for empirical
identification strategies that compare changes in the R&D activity of
affiliates of different MNE groups located in the same country that
do and do not experience R&D tax cost shocks in other locations of
their MNE group. We thus control non-parametrically for potential
unobserved time-varying host country confounders, like changes in
countries’ regulatory framework, technology base or patenting system.
Drawing on micro-level data, furthermore, comes with the advantage
that it allows us to test for effect heterogeneity across firms and that
aggregation bias is avoided — that is, contrary to macro-level studies,
we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the average corporate response
to R&D tax incentives.7
Finally, note that recent related work (Wilson, 2009, and Akcigit
et al., 2018), contrary to our study, assesses cross-border R&D tax
effects in subnational rather than international contexts. Wilson (2009)
acknowledges that insights from his U.S. state-level analysis may not
carry over to federal-level R&D tax policy settings but hypothesizes that
‘‘large foreign and U.S. multinationals, which are responsible for the
bulk of U.S. R&D spending, may fairly easily reallocate R&D activity
to (from) the U.S. in response to favorable (unfavorable) changes in
U.S. policy vis-à-vis foreign policy" (Wilson, 2009; p. 436). Our findings
support this presumption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents theoretical considerations. Sections 3 and 4 describe the es-
timation approach and the dataset used. The empirical results are
presented in Section 5. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical considerations
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, we sketch channels
through which R&D tax incentives may impact MNEs’ R&D investment
choice. Consider an MNE that engages in R&D and operates in two
countries, denoted by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴,𝐵}, each of which can potentially serve
as a location for R&D investment. To simplify notation, we denote by
𝑔𝑖 the firm’s net-of-tax profit from R&D, that is the difference between
7 If firms react heterogeneously to R&D incentives, aggregate estimates can
iffer substantially from the average microeconomic response (see e.g., Gupta,
971; Sasaki, 1978; Pesaran et al., 1989). Pesaran et al. (1989) find an
pward bias in the estimates of real wage elasticities obtained from aggregated
ata. In their study, aggregate estimation approaches also perform worse than3
icroeconomic estimation approaches in predicting aggregate variables.the net-of-tax value of R&D output and R&D input costs in 𝑖. 𝑔𝑖 is a
unction of the firm’s R&D investment at location 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, as well as R&D
nvestment at the other location, 𝑥−𝑖. After-tax profits in 𝑖, moreover,
irectly depend on the effective R&D tax costs in 𝑖, denoted by 𝑡𝑖:
𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 𝑡𝑖). While 𝑔𝑖 declines in the host location tax, 𝜕𝑔
𝑖
𝜕𝑡𝑖 < 0,




𝜕𝑥−𝑖 > 0. The
arginal product of R&D investment is, moreover, assumed to decline




𝜕(𝑥−𝑖)2 < 0. Cross-border effects of R&D
nvestments on the profit contribution of R&D investment at the other









𝑖. The MNE maximizes 𝛱 by choosing R&D investment




𝐴 = 0, (1)
𝑔𝐴𝐵 + 𝑔
𝐵
𝐵 = 0 (2)
where the subscript denotes the first derivative of the 𝑔𝑖 function with
respect to R&D investment in countries A and B, respectively (e.g. 𝑔𝐴𝐴 =
𝜕𝑔𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴 ). Without loss of generality, we determine the impact of changes in
the tax rate of country A, 𝑡𝐴, on R&D investment at the two locations.
Symmetric effects can be derived for changes in 𝑡𝐵 . Comparative statics






























where the second subscript denotes the second derivative of 𝑔𝑖 with
regard to 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 respectively (e.g. 𝑔𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
𝜕2𝑔𝐴
𝜕𝑥2𝐴
). Cramer’s rule yields










Analogously, it can be shown that the cross-border effect of the
ffective tax burden in country 𝐴 on R&D investment in country 𝐵,
𝑑𝑥𝐵

















R&D investment in country 𝐴 lowers the marginal profit contribution
of R&D investment in country 𝐵 and R&D investments in countries 𝐴
and 𝐵 act as substitutes. Higher R&D tax costs in 𝐴 then increase R&D
investment in 𝐵, 𝑑𝑥
𝐵




𝐵𝐴 > 0, R&D investments
n countries 𝐴 and 𝐵 act as complements and higher R&D tax costs in
decrease R&D investment in 𝐵, 𝑑𝑥
𝐵
𝑑𝑡𝐴 < 0. Below we discuss potential
mechanisms that may establish a substitutionary or complementary link
between R&D investment at MNE group locations in different countries.
Note that analogous predictions can be derived for the general case,
where the MNE operates R&D activities in a set  of more than two
countries, with 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴,𝐵, 𝐶,…}. The MNE’s after tax profits then
reads: 𝛱 = ∑ 𝑔(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 𝑡𝑖), where 𝑥−𝑖 denotes the vector of the MNE’s
R&D investment in all countries other than 𝑖. The FOC for 𝑥𝐴 reads:
 𝑔
𝑖




𝜕𝑥𝐴 ). Analogous FOCs are derived for R&D in all
other countries. As the choice of R&D investment in a particular country
affects the MNE’s profits in all locations, it depends on the full tax rate
vector (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵 , 𝑡𝐶 ,…). In the empirical analysis to come, we therefore
model R&D activity at a given MNE group location as a function of the
effective host country tax rate and the tax rates at all other affiliates
that serve as potential R&D locations.
R&D Investments as Substitutes
Cross-border mobility of R&D investments (documented, e.g., in
Bloom and Griffith, 2001; Abramovsky et al., 2008; OECD, 2008;
Iversen et al., 2016) predicts a substitutionary relationship of R&D
activity at different group locations: MNEs respond to increased R&D
tax incentives by shifting R&D investments from other group locations
to the policy-changing jurisdiction. In the framing of our theoretical




























































































model: If R&D tax costs decline in country 𝐴, it is optimal for the MNE
to expand R&D investments in 𝐴. This lowers the marginal product of
R&D investments at other locations 𝐵 (𝑔𝐴𝐵𝐴, 𝑔
𝐵
𝐵𝐴 < 0) and renders it op-
timal to decrease R&D investment there ( 𝑑𝑥
𝐵
𝑑𝑡𝐴 > 0). Note that the firm’s
global R&D response may still be positive but the aggregate response
is then smaller than the observed response in the policy-changing
country. Put differently, the positive link between R&D investments
and host country tax incentives documented in prior empirical research
may root in cross-border relocations or reflect genuinely new R&D
undertaken by the firm. If cross-border relocations are quantitatively
relevant, R&D tax subsidies decrease R&D activity at foreign group
locations and, in that sense, act as beggar-thy-neighbor instruments.
The impact on foreign welfare is ambiguous though: On the one hand,
reduction in foreign R&D may lower foreign knowledge production,
oreign productivity and income. Such negative cross-border effects
re particularly likely to emerge if innovation mainly serves as an
nput to the MNE’s local value creation — that is, if R&D increases
he productivity of group affiliates located in the same country. On
he contrary, foreign affiliates’ productivity and income might increase
f tax incentives raise MNEs’ global R&D and if innovation serves as
n input into MNEs’ global value creation (i.e., R&D conducted in one
ountry raises the productivity of MNE affiliates in other countries).
Also note that response rates may be heterogeneous across firms.
ross-border R&D mobility – and, therefore, the tax responsiveness of
orporate R&D investment – may vary across firms. Firms may be more
illing to reallocate R&D activity if group affiliates are geographically
lose, reflecting regional location preferences or transaction costs that
ise with geographic distance (e.g., Thisse, 2011; Hutzschenreuter et al.,
016). R&D investments might also be more tax sensitive in large
irms, consistent with the notion that benefits from R&D tax planning
ncrease in firm size, while implementation costs are largely fixed.
he opposite might also be true, however: If large firms can easily
ircumvent high statutory tax burdens by shifting income to low-tax
ountries (as, e.g., suggested by Dharmapala, 2014 and Davies et al.,
018), their R&D investments might be unresponsive to tax incentives.
&D Investments as Complements
R&D investments at different MNE group locations might also be
omplements. New R&D investments at one group location may, for ex-
mple, yield knowledge output that generates MNE-internal knowledge
pillovers and increases the yields from R&D investments at other group
ocations (see e.g., Bilir and Morales, 2020). Increased tax incentives
hen raise R&D investments in the policy-changing country and abroad.
n the framing of our theoretical model: If R&D tax costs decline in
ountry 𝐴, it is optimal for the MNE to expand R&D investments in
. This increases the marginal product of R&D investments at other
ocations 𝐵 (𝑔𝐴𝐵𝐴, 𝑔
𝐵
𝐵𝐴 > 0) and renders it optimal to increase R&D in-
estment there ( 𝑑𝑥
𝐵
𝑑𝑡𝐴 < 0). A complementary link between domestic and
oreign investment might also emerge if firms are credit constrained
nd need to rely on internal resources to finance R&D investments
see e.g., Hall et al., 2016).8 When tax costs fall at one location, the
nduced cash increase can be used to finance new R&D investments in
he policy-changing country and at other locations of the MNE group.
rrespective of the mechanism at work: If R&D activities at different
roup locations act as complements, the global R&D tax response
8 R&D is more difficult to finance than other investments as collateraliza-
ion is difficult or even impossible. Furthermore, problems of opportunistic
ehavior, adverse selection and moral hazard affecting the financing of capital
nvestments in general are exacerbated in the case of R&D as issues related
o contract incompleteness, opaqueness and information asymmetries between
irms and investors are more pervasive (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Raising
xternal funds for R&D investments hence tends to be difficult, implying that
irms often have to rely on internal finance for this type of investment (Myers
nd Majluf, 1984). See also Hall et al. (2016).4
exceeds the observed response in the policy-changing country. R&D tax
incentives then raise foreign R&D activity and welfare.
Whether R&D tax incentives increase or decrease R&D activity in
foreign countries thus remains an empirical question. Given that MNEs
are responsible for a large share of private sector innovations, the sign
and size of this cross-border effect is decisive for understanding the
global welfare consequences of R&D tax incentives. In the following,
we present firm-level estimates for this effect.
3. Estimation methodology
Our empirical analysis models the R&D investment 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 of MNE
roup 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡, where an MNE’s activity in a given
ountry is referred to as an MNE group location. Prior studies focused
n quantifying the effect of lagged host country R&D tax costs 𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠
n firms’ R&D investment 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡. Following this research, we estimate a






𝛼1𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜆𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡
)
(5)
here 𝜆𝑖,𝑐 and 𝛿𝑡 denote full sets of MNE group location-fixed effects
nd year-fixed effects, respectively. The tax regressor 𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 enters with
lag to account for the time gap between R&D investments and
atentable results. We use lags of one, two and three years (𝑠 ∈
1, 2, 3}). Correspondingly, the vector 𝑋𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 comprises lagged host
ountry control variables (country size, economic development, gov-
rnance characteristics, FDI inflows and direct government support for
usiness R&D not granted through the tax system; see Section 4 for
ariable definitions). R&D investments are proxied by the number of
ranted patent applications filed by MNE 𝑖 in country 𝑐, dated by
ear of application 𝑡. An advantage of the PPML model that makes it
articularly well-suited for estimations involving patent applications is
ts broad applicability to non-linear relationships (Silva and Tenreyro,
006). It is also consistent when using dependent variables with many
eros such as corporate patent applications where not all firms apply for
patent every year (Silva and Tenreyro, 2011). The MNE-location-fixed
ffects 𝜆𝑖,𝑐 absorb time-constant heterogeneity across group locations
nd the time-varying control variables hedge against potential corre-
ations of host country R&D tax costs and multinational R&D activity
ith other time-varying economic or institutional characteristics.
Following our considerations in Section 2, we modify this spec-
fication to test for cross-border effects of R&D tax incentives. This
equires modeling where cross-border effects accrue. Prior macro-level
tudies assume them to emerge in geographically close and economi-
ally connected jurisdictions. Our micro-level data, in turn, allows for
more direct and accurate modeling based on observed MNE group
tructures. This follows the theoretical considerations in Section 2 that
ross-border relocations of R&D for tax purposes, no matter if positive
r negative, arise within the MNE group. We thus add regressors for the
verage R&D tax costs levied by the host countries of MNE 𝑖’s other
ocations −𝑐 in year 𝑡, ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠; corresponding averages for the other
oreign host country characteristics (country size, economic develop-
ent, governance characteristics, FDI inflows and direct government
pending for R&D) are subsumed in ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠. Our model now reads
𝐸
(




𝛽1𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽2?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽4?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜆𝑖,𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡
) (6)
he theoretical considerations in Section 2 predict a negative sign for
1. For the sign of 𝛽2, predictions are ambiguous. While estimating 𝛽2
s at the heart of our paper, omitting ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 may bias the estimate of
1 with the sign of this bias being a priori unclear.9
9 In the presence of cross-border tax cost effects, control units in foreign
ountries are affected by the treatment: The 𝛽1-estimate is too large (too small),
in absolute terms, if the cross-border tax cost effect on foreign firms’ R&D is











Eq. (6) identifies cross-border effects of R&D tax incentives by
comparing changes in 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 for cases where foreign affiliates within
the same MNE group do and do not experience changes in their
host country R&D tax costs (or experience changes of different size).
Importantly, treatment and control firms may be located in different
countries, implying that country-specific R&D time trends (not rooted
in control variable trends) may confound the estimates. Our micro
panel data allows us to augment the estimation model by a full set








𝛾1?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛾2?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜆𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜌𝑐,𝑡
)
(7)
The cross-border relocation effect 𝛾2 is now estimated by comparing
changes in the R&D investment of MNE group locations in the same
country that belong to MNEs with and without group locations in
foreign jurisdictions that change their R&D tax treatment (or change it
to a different degree). Contrary to prior macro-level research, country-
specific R&D trends are hence absorbed in our analysis.10 In robustness
tests, we, moreover, estimate models that include region-year-fixed
effects at the subnational level to allow for divergence of R&D time
trends at an even more refined geographical level and specify models
that control for industry-specific R&D time trends.11 The specifications
thus non-parametrically account for potential time-varying non-tax
determinants of firms’ R&D and patenting activity at given locations,
like changes in the country’s technology base or patenting system.
4. Data
The empirical analysis uses data on the R&D activity of MNEs in
Europe that is matched to country-level information on R&D tax incen-
tives and other economic and institutional characteristics. The sample
frame comprises the years 2000 to 2012. As described in Section 3, we
rely on information on unconsolidated R&D activity at each individual
group location, i.e., information for each individual country in which
the MNE is active.12 Our sample comprises both parent and subsidiary
firms. Conceptually, there are two key advantages to using unconsoli-
dated rather than consolidated data. First, modeling individual group
locations explicitly acknowledges that their behavior is not only shaped
by the MNE’s central management but also by local managements’
decisions. Second, it allows us to isolate cross-border effects of R&D
tax incentives from effects of host country tax policies.13 Consolidated
data would, in turn, only allow testing for the joint effect of the two
positive (negative) and the ?̄?𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 regressor is omitted. In the words of Rubin
(1978), the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is violated. If a
violation of SUTVA is the only source of bias and all control observations are
affected by the treatment, 𝛽2 corresponds to the absolute bias in the 𝛽1-estimate
when ?̄?𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 is omitted. If only a fraction of the control observations is affected
by the treatment, the absolute bias in the 𝛽1-estimate becomes smaller than
𝛽2. On top of that, the omission of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 biases the 𝛽1-estimate if R&D tax
policies are correlated across countries and taxes, simultaneously, exert cross-
border R&D effects. The estimate of 𝛽1 is too small (too large) in absolute terms
f R&D tax policies are positively (negatively) correlated and cross-country tax
ffects on foreign R&D are positive (negative).
10 Note that the variable of interest can equivalently be thought of as the
ifference in tax cost between home and foreign countries as the coefficient
stimates and the fit of the regression remain the same when substituting
̄
𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 by (?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 − 𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠).
11 See Table 6 in Section 5.
12 This follows many empirical micro-level data studies on taxes and multi-
ational firm behavior (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Dischinger and Riedel,
011; Gumpert et al., 2016; Goldbach et al., 2019).
13 Cluster-robust standard errors account for correlation of observations
ithin the same MNE which also ensures that standard errors are not arti-
icially deflated by giving larger groups too much weight based on the false
remise that the related observations are independent.5
by linking consolidated R&D activity to the average R&D tax costs at
MNE group locations. Related analyses are presented in supplemental
tests.14
Measuring R&D Activity
Our analysis thus requires modeling R&D activity per MNE group
location and year. There are two common proxies for R&D investments
in the literature: corporate R&D expenditure and patent output. In this
paper, we follow the latter strategy and use the number of granted
patent applications filed by an MNE group location in a given year
as a measure for R&D activity. Following standard procedures, we use
patents that are ultimately granted, dated by year of application (see
e.g. Aghion et al., 2013; Seru, 2014; Bena and Li, 2014; Akcigit et al.,
2018; Atanassov and Liu, 2020; Mukherjee et al., 2017).15 There are
some drawbacks of using patent counts as a proxy for corporate R&D:
Patents might reflect strategic use of intellectual property and only
R&D that eventually becomes a successful innovation is captured. Prior
literature, however, documents that the number of patents is highly
correlated with R&D expenditure and other measures of corporate R&D
activity (Hausman et al., 1984; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Artz et al.,
2010). We corroborate this evidence by showing that country-level
R&D expenditure and country-level patent counts are highly correlated,
both in the cross-section as well as over time. Even when accounting
for country- and year-specific effects, we derive a correlation coefficient
of greater than 0.75 (see Table A.1). In line with this observation,
existing evidence reports comparable own-country R&D tax effects
when proxying R&D by patent counts and R&D expenditure (see,
e.g., Dechezleprêtre et al., 2017). Also note that there are explicit
advantages of using patents as a measure for corporate R&D. Notably,
the measure is not subject to concerns about firms simply relabeling
some expenses as R&D-related when a country increases input-related
R&D tax incentives such as tax credits, super-deductions and accel-
erated depreciation.16 Patent data, moreover, is particularly useful
when studying international R&D activity as patents constitute a simple
measure that is comparable across countries. This allows us to identify
MNEs’ unconsolidated R&D activities in different locations, which would
be largely infeasible based on other R&D measures like R&D spending
or the number of R&D workers. The latter information is commonly
only available in consolidated company accounts. Disaggregated data
on R&D expenditure must thus be drawn from surveys and corporate
tax returns which are restricted to individual countries (and are thus
by definition not well suited to study cross-border effects). Definitional
differences, in general, limit their comparability across countries.
Proxying firms’ R&D activity based on patent data, moreover, comes
with the advantage that patents are a measure of R&D output rather
than R&D input. As it is the ultimate aim of R&D policies to foster
innovation (and hence R&D output; not R&D inputs per se), patent data
allows for a more direct evaluation of R&D tax policies than R&D input
measures like R&D spending.
Patent Data
Our patent data is drawn from the administrative patent database
PATSTAT, which is operated by the European Patent Office and pro-
vides patent information from patent offices worldwide, including all
14 See Table 9 in Section 5.
15 Non-granted applications are disregarded as this would distort the anal-
ysis due to strategic patenting behavior and patent trolls (Cohen et al.,
2019). Harhoff and Wagner (2009) report that less than 60% of patent
applications are eventually granted.
16 Chen et al. (2021), for example, found substantial relabeling of expen-
ditures as R&D following a change in Chinese corporate tax rules. A recent
survey by Bloom et al. (2019) notes that it may therefore be a more ‘‘direct
way to assess the success of the R&D tax credit [...] to look at other outcomes
such as patenting" (p. 170). As patent filing at the end of R&D processes
(commonly several years after initial R&D investment) is not a prerequisite
for being eligible to R&D tax benefits (granted at the time of investment),
‘‘relabeling" is plausibly not an issue in our analysis.























































European national patent offices and supranational patent offices. Fol-
lowing the existing literature, we thus construct the unconsolidated
number of patent applications per firm and year, using only patents
where the majority of inventors is located in the same country as
the patent filing firm (see e.g., Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie, 2001) to ensure that the number of patent applications reflects
domestic R&D activity.17 If firms file for patent protection in several
ountries, the patented technology is, analogous to prior studies, only
ounted once. Because we only consider patents linked to local R&D
ctivity, we speak of R&D locations rather than patenting locations in
ur analysis in order to avoid confusion of the location of R&D activity
nd the patenting process. The latter also depends on the location of the
hosen patent office. The analysis acknowledges that the distribution
f patents’ industrial value is highly skewed (see e.g., Harhoff et al.,
999 and Graevenitz et al., 2013) and that, in expectation, more R&D
nput is needed to produce a higher-value technological innovation.
e calculate the value of each patent based on three common value
orrelates: the number of forward citations within a five-year period
rom the granting date of the patent, the patent’s family size and the
umber of technology classes on the patent (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2007).
he composite technological quality index is derived from a factor
nalysis (e.g., Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
Using the number of granted patents as proxy for corporate R&D ac-
ivity raises potential concerns about data truncation since the granting
rocess usually takes several years (see e.g., Harhoff and Wagner, 2009
nd Bösenberg and Egger, 2017). At the end of our sample frame, the
easure might hence be determined by (potential differences in) the
peed of patent granting decisions. To account for this issue, we end
ur sample frame in 2012 despite observing data on patent applications
p to 2017. Fig. A.1 suggests that the large majority of patents, which
re eventually granted, are indeed granted within a five year frame: The
umber of granted patent applications in our dataset significantly drops
nly in years after 2012. For patents filed in 2012, all patents granted
ithin 5 years from their filing date are hence adequately reflected in
ur data.18 To further corroborate this evidence, we present sensitivity
ests showing that our baseline findings also hold in shorter sample
rames.19
ultinational Firms and Sample Selection
The patent data is linked to firm-level information in Bureau van
ijk’s AMADEUS database, which provides accounting and ownership
nformation for firms in Europe. The link between the two databases is
chieved through name and address matching implemented by Bureau
on Dijk. Corporate groups are defined based on ownership connections
n AMADEUS. Specifically, we identify the ultimate owner of each
irm (the entity that ultimately – directly or indirectly – owns at
east 50% of the firm’s shares) and define all firms owned by this
ltimate owner as a corporate group. If at least one firm is located
n a different country than the ultimate owner, the group is defined
o be an MNE group and all of its affiliated firms enter the estimation
ample. We aggregate affiliates located in the same country as they are
ubject to the same tax regime and group structure. For instance, if
n MNE group has affiliates in three different countries in a particular
17 While applicants may be firms or individuals, patent inventors are nec-
ssarily individuals. In case of corporate patents, usually the leading R&D
orkers are stated as inventors. Note, that the number of cases where the
atent filing entity and the technology inventors are located in different
ountries is small (see e.g., Baumann et al., 2020). We disregard these patents
n the empirical analysis to avoid picking up effects related to strategic shifting
f patent ownership to low-tax countries (see e.g., Karkinsky and Riedel,
012; Griffith et al., 2014).
18 For patent applications from 2005, for which we plausibly observe all
ranting decisions until 2017, the large majority of granting decisions (80%)
s indeed taken within 5 years (see Fig. A.2).
19 See Table A.26
Table 1
Country distribution.
Country Country code Firms Patents
Austria AT 109 1,634
Belgium BE 72 1,856
Switzerland CH 228 5,513
Czech Republic CZ 57 576
Germany DE 583 22,401
Denmark DK 78 626
Spain ES 140 1,896
Finland FI 85 1,693
France FR 425 14,053
United Kingdom GB 447 7,841
Hungary HU 11 19
Ireland IE 17 140
Italy IT 212 3,970
Luxembourg LU 11 84
Netherlands NL 136 1,185
Norway NO 60 448
Poland PL 48 164
Portugal PT 13 46
Sweden SE 136 5,274
Other 29 177
Sum 2,793 69,596
Notes: This table presents the distribution of MNE group locations across sample
countries. The category ‘‘Other’’ comprises group locations in Greece, Iceland, Latvia,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Turkey.
year, we have three observations for this MNE group in that year.20
The definition of MNEs’ group structures dynamically accounts for
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the sample horizon, drawn
from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database, and for new firm foundations.
Also note that, while the sample firms are located in Europe, ownership
connections in AMADEUS span the whole world and the sample thus
comprises firms affiliated with MNEs headquartered outside Europe. In
consequence, we observe two types of MNE groups in the data: (i) MNEs
headquartered in Europe where information on all relevant European
R&D group locations is available and (ii) MNEs headquartered outside
Europe where arguably only a subset of R&D locations is observed in
the data.21 In Section 5, we discuss implications for the interpretation of
he results and present robustness checks where the sample is restricted
o the former set of MNEs.22
As information is aggregated across an MNE’s affiliates in the same
country and year, the dependent variable is the quality-adjusted num-
ber of granted patent applications per MNE group location and year.23
The sample covers the years 2000 to 2012. Years before 2000 are
disregarded as we lack reliable information on ownership structures
and tax incentives. As mentioned above, we end the sample in 2012
to avoid data truncation.
20 Note that only group locations where MNEs file for at least one patent
within our sample frame enter the data (see below). As group affiliates are
aggregated at the country-level, even large MNEs enter with a limited number
of observations only. The top 1% of MNEs (in terms of number of locations
within the MNE where R&D is conducted) hence account for just 4.7% of the
sample observations. These MNEs have on average 10.49 such locations. In a
sensitivity test in Table A.2, we exclude these observations from the sample
and obtain similar results as the baseline estimations.
21 For example, if there is an MNE headquartered in the US with two
subsidiaries in France and the UK, we observe all of these subsidiaries and
treat them as belonging to one MNE but we do not observe subsidiaries located
outside of Europe.
22 See Table 6 in Section 5.
23 Note that the value per patent derived from a factor analysis contains
both, positive and negative values. To allow meaningful aggregation, we shift
the distribution of patent quality by the absolute value of the minimum to the
right. This ensures non-negative industrial values for all patents in the data,
while not affecting the relative ordering of patent quality.
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104326B. Knoll et al.Fig. 1. Ownership Connections of Firms in Germany, France and the United Kingdom to Foreign Countries. Notes: This figure displays ownership connections to patenting foreign
affiliates of firms in the estimation sample that are located in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. For each of the three countries, we sum the number of links to other
countries (i.e., the number of foreign affiliates in individual countries that are in the same MNE group) across all firms located in that country for each year in the sample period.
We then take the average of this value across time (displayed in parentheses). To simplify the presentation, we only show locations with at least 4 affiliates in the average sample
year. Larger nodes around country codes indicate a higher number of cross-border links.f
t
𝑇
The sample is, moreover, restricted to MNE groups with positive
patenting activity during the sample frame, i.e., group locations that
successfully filed for at least one patent in the sample period. We,
moreover, assign zeros in years without patent applications. In total,
the data comprises information on 1151 MNEs and 2793 MNE group
locations hosted by 26 European countries. In Fig. 1, we illustrate the
intra-group cross-border links to other R&D-active MNE affiliates for
the three largest economies in the sample: Germany, France and the
United Kingdom. While firms in each of these countries have strong
links to other large economies, they are also connected to smaller
countries indicating that there is substantial variation in the network
structure of MNE groups. Table 1, moreover, presents the country
distribution of all group locations which broadly matches with the
distribution of aggregate R&D investments and firm counts in the
sample economies. Note, moreover, that by focusing on MNEs, we7
capture the large majority of R&D activity performed in the sample
countries (see, e.g., Hall, 2012).24
R&D Tax Incentives
Countries’ R&D tax treatment is modeled by the B-index, initially
introduced by McFetridge and Warda (1983). The B-index 𝑇𝑐,𝑡 for
country 𝑐 in period 𝑡 measures the minimum pre-tax earnings required
or an R&D project to break even and serves as a measure for the R&D
ax costs of a representative firm in country 𝑐. It is defined as
𝑐,𝑡 =
1 −𝑍𝑐,𝑡 ⋅ 𝜏𝑐,𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑐,𝑡
(8)
where 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 indicates the corporate tax rate of country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 and
𝑍𝑐,𝑡 measures the deductibility of R&D expenditure from the corporate
tax base, accounting for R&D related tax allowances and current tax
expenditures as well as for R&D tax credits. The numerator of the B-
index captures the marginal cost of a one-dollar-investment in R&D in
24 Note that the sample firms are located in 26 European countries, but
ownership links in AMADEUS span the whole world.


























Fig. 2. Average of B-index in the Sample Countries. Notes: The graph plots the
unweighted average of the B-index in the sample countries against time.
Fig. 3. B-index in 2012 (if < 0.95) and # of Changes of B-index in Sample Period.
otes: The graph depicts countries’ B-index in 2012 as well as the number of B-
ndex changes during the sample period (2000–2012) exceeding 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
espectively, in absolute terms. The graph shows all sample countries with a B-index
elow 0.95 in 2012. The other sample countries, not depicted in this figure, experienced
inor changes in the B-index only and feature a B-index of around 1 in 2012, see
ig. A.3.
given country after taxes. The more generous the deductibility of R&D
osts from the corporate tax base, the smaller the expression in the
umerator. The denominator accounts for the fact that the proceeds
rom R&D investments are taxed at rate 𝜏𝑐,𝑡. If the R&D investment can
be fully deducted in the fiscal year, 𝑍𝑐,𝑡 and consequently also the B-
index take on the value one. More generous R&D tax credits and tax
allowances reduce the B-index below unity. The lower the B-index, the
smaller the required pre-tax return for an R&D investment project to
break even and the more attractive the tax incentive scheme.
We note that the B-index measure is closely related to the concept
of the user cost of capital for R&D (e.g., see Hall and Jorgenson,
1967; Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009; Montmartin and Herrera,
2015; Brown et al., 2017) as a measure of the marginal cost of R&D
inputs. Specifically, the B-index isolates the tax component from other
factors that affect the user cost of capital for R&D (e.g., interest rates,
depreciation rates) and thus allows us to study the tax effect on cor-
porate R&D. To ensure that the estimated tax effect is not conditional
on other user cost components, we present robustness checks where8
we replace the B-index by the user cost of R&D capital as computed
by Bloom et al. (2002) and Wilson (2009).25
Our B-index information is drawn from Bösenberg and Egger (2017).
Fig. 2 depicts the average B-index in Europe and shows that it signif-
icantly declined during the sample frame. Fig. 3, moreover, displays
sample countries with attractive R&D tax treatment as measured by
a B-index below 0.95 in 2012, showing that most of these countries
experienced significant B-index changes during the sample period (in
most cases reductions). Note, moreover, that these changes took place
in a staggered way: B-index cuts larger than 0.1 were experienced
by firms in Spain in 2001, Norway in 2002, Hungary in 2004, Czech
Republic in 2005, Italy in 2007, France and Turkey in 2008 and the
Netherlands in 2012. Fig. A.3 shows a graph analogous to Fig. 3 for
sample countries with less attractive R&D tax treatment as measured
by a B-index above 0.95 in 2012, showing that their B-index remained
mostly unchanged during the sample period. Note that variation in the
B-index largely reflects changes in R&D input incentives like super-
deductions or R&D tax credits. While variation in statutory corporate
tax rates may also trigger B-index shifts, their impact tends to be minor.
All major B-index cuts observed during our sample frame relate to
reforms which expanded the generosity of R&D tax credits and tax
deductions.26
As described above, the analysis, moreover, assesses whether the
R&D activity of MNE 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 is affected by R&D tax
provisions in other locations. For this purpose, we define the average





where 𝑗 indicates group locations of MNE 𝑖 other than 𝑐. 𝑇𝑗𝑡 stands for
he host country B-index at another location 𝑗 of the MNE group in year
𝑡 and 𝑊𝑖𝑗 depicts the weight of 𝑗 in the calculation of this average.
n the baseline analysis, we employ asset weights, reflecting that the
ross-border tax effect is expected to be larger the size of the other
NE group location that experiences the tax shock.27 Note, moreover,
hat firm locations, where we only observe incidental R&D – defined as
ocations that file for less than 10% of all of the MNE’s granted patents
ithin the sample frame – are disregarded in the calculation of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡.
n robustness checks, we show results where ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 is calculated based
n alternative weighting schemes.
ontrol Variables and Descriptive Statistics
We augment the data by control variables that capture impor-
ant drivers of R&D activity such as market size (Athukorala and
ohpaiboon, 2010) and scientific capacity (Thomson, 2013). These in-
lude host country size (GDP), economic development (GDP per capita)
nd openness (FDI), all drawn from the World Development Indicator
atabase. The analysis includes control variables for the quality of
25 See Table 7 in Section 5.
26 In Table A.3, we show that conditioning on statutory corporate tax rates
does not alter the estimated link between B-index and corporate R&D.
27 Precisely, 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is defined as the average of total assets at MNE group
location 𝑗 across sample years over the sum of this variable across all foreign
R&D hosts of MNE 𝑖. For group locations with missing information on total
assets, we assign the average total assets of the set of other MNE group
locations to avoid losing these locations in the calculation of the size-weighted
average. Note, moreover, that the definition of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 implies that we disregard
MNEs when 100% of the patent output is generated in one location and MNEs
are, therefore, not truly multinational in their R&D activity. All other MNEs
are included because even if one of the locations of an MNE conducts more
than 90% of the R&D activity, there are still some locations that also conduct
R&D and are potentially interesting for our analysis. For these locations, ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡
reflects B-index changes at the main R&D hub.










No. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Quality Weighted Patent Count 23,499 2.470 14.070 0.000 548.018
Domestic Inventors 23,593 10.418 56.816 0.000 1,358.000
B-index (t-2) 23,499 0.931 0.123 0.559 1.042
Avg. Foreign B-index (t-2) 23,499 0.946 0.106 0.559 1.042
Min. Foreign B-index (t-2) 23,499 0.915 0.131 0.559 1.042
Adj. B-index (t-2) 23,499 0.643 0.103 0.363 0.907
Avg. Foreign adj. B-index (t-2) 23,499 0.644 0.088 0.363 0.907
User Cost of Capital (t-2) 23,481 0.301 0.042 0.131 0.452
Avg. Foreign User Cost of Capital (t-2) 23,471 0.306 0.037 0.131 0.452
Corporate Tax Rate (t-2) 23,499 0.309 0.063 0.100 0.516
Avg. Foreign Corporate Tax Rate (CTR, t-2) 23,499 0.319 0.060 0.100 0.516
Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR, t-2) 23,499 0.269 0.073 0.042 0.508
Avg. Foreign EATR (t-2) 23,499 0.284 0.072 0.042 0.508
1∕(1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅) (t-2) 23,499 1.460 0.142 1.111 2.066
Avg. Foreign 1∕(1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅) (t-2) 23,499 1.483 0.142 1.111 2.066
Log GDP p.c. (t-2) 23,499 10.487 0.359 8.119 11.356
Avg. Foreign Log GDP p.c. (t-2) 23,499 10.522 0.247 8.119 11.381
Log FDI (t-2) 23,499 24.261 1.219 17.348 27.322
Avg. Foreign Log FDI (t-2) 23,499 24.409 1.069 17.348 27.322
Political Stability (t-2) 23,499 0.781 0.443 −1.032 1.668
Avg. Foreign Political Stability (t-2) 23,499 0.800 0.384 −1.032 1.668
Rule of Law (t-2) 23,499 1.516 0.419 −0.269 2.000
Avg. Foreign Rule of Law (t-2) 23,499 1.564 0.331 −0.269 2.000
Direct R&D support (t-2) 23,499 8.296 3.820 0.427 21.830
Avg. Foreign Direct R&D support (t-2) 23,499 8.668 3.338 0.427 21.830
Avg. Foreign Research Expenditure (as % of GDP, t-2) 22,997 2.158 0.570 0.366 3.726
Avg. Foreign Log Patent Applications of Residents (t-2) 23,328 9.372 1.150 2.708 10.820
Avg. Foreign Pre-tax Profitability (t-2) 20,807 0.176 0.056 0.021 0.455
Notes: The observational unit is the MNE group location per year. Quality Weighted Patent Count is the quality-adjusted number
of patents per year for the MNE group locations in the data. Domestic Inventors is the number of inventors cited on patent
documents for the MNE group locations. B-index (t-2) is the second lag of the B-index (𝑇𝑐;𝑡−2 as defined in the main text) and
Avg. Foreign B-index (t-2) is the asset-weighted average B-index in other locations of the same MNE group (𝑇 𝑖;−𝑐;𝑡−2, lagged by
two years, as defined in the main text). Min. Foreign B-index (t-2) is the smallest B-index within the MNE group in period 𝑡−2.
Adj. B-index (t-2) denotes the second lag of the B-index multiplied by the net of corporate tax rate (1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅). The User Cost
of Capital (t-2) are calculated based on the lagged B-index, a depreciation rate of 30% and the long-term interest rate (see
details in the main text). Log GDP p.c. (t-2) depicts the second lag of the log of host country GDP per capita, Log FDI (t-2) the
second lag of the log of the host country’s aggregate inward foreign direct investment. Political Stability (t-2) and Rule of Law
(t-2) depict the second lags of the governance indicators for political stability and rule of law of the World Bank’s Governance
Data. Direct R&D support (t-2) is the second lag of the business enterprise expenditure for R&D that is directly financed by the
government as a percentage of GDP (reported in percentage points). Avg. Foreign Research Expenditure (as % of GDP, t-2) is the
average percentage of total research expenditures of GDP in host countries of other MNE group locations lagged by two years.
Avg. Foreign Log Patent Applications of Residents (t-2) depicts the average log of aggregate patent applications in other locations
of the same MNE group. Avg. Foreign Pre-tax Profitability (t-2) is the average Pre-tax profitability of national firms in other
MNE group locations (see main text for details). Avg. Foreign B-index (t-2), Avg. Foreign adj. B-index (t-2), Avg. Foreign User Cost
of Capital (t-2), Avg. Foreign Corporate Tax Rate (CTR, t-2), Avg. Log GDP p.c. (t-2), Avg. Foreign FDI (t-2), Avg. Foreign Political
Stability (t-2), Avg. Foreign Rule of Law (t-2) and Avg. Foreign Direct R&D support (t-2) depict the asset-weighted averages of
these variables at foreign locations within the same MNE as the group location under consideration. Note, moreover, that
the descriptive statistics are depicted for the sample of group location-year observations with non-missing information for the
patent count variable and all depicted host and foreign country characteristics in 𝑡−2 that are included in the baseline results
of Table 3, specifications (B4)–(B6).governance institutions as measured by the World Bank’s Governance
Indicators.28
Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 2. On
average, the MNE group locations in the dataset successfully file for
2.5 quality-adjusted patents per sample year; the distribution exhibits
a large standard deviation, however, and ranges from 0 to 548 quality-
adjusted patent applications. The average host country B-index is
0.931, but we observe index variation between 0.56 (reflecting heavy
subsidization of R&D investments) and 1.04 (reflecting disincentives for
R&D).
28 Specifically, we account for the World Bank’s political stability and rule
f law indicators (that strongly correlate with other common governance
ndicators). On top of that, we use information available from the OECD to
ccount for the amount of direct government support for business R&D, that is
&D support not granted through the tax system. These variables are included
s host country controls for the MNE group locations in the data. Furthermore,
e model economic and institutional changes in other MNE group locations9
y calculating the averages of these variables, analogously to (9).5. Results
Baseline Findings
The baseline results are presented in Table 3. The specifications
in Panel A estimate Eq. (5) of Section 3 and test whether host coun-
try R&D tax incentives impact on multinational R&D activity. Robust
standard errors that allow for deviations from the Poisson distribution
(see e.g., Wooldridge, 2010) and clustering on the MNE group level
are depicted in brackets.29 Specification (A1) regresses the number of
quality-adjusted patent applications of MNE 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 on
the host country’s B-index in 𝑡−1, controlling for year-fixed effects and
MNE group location-fixed effects. In line with intuition and with prior
evidence, the results show a negative effect of host country R&D tax
costs on multinational R&D investment. A rise in the B-index by 0.1 (≈
one standard deviation, cf. Table 2) is estimated to lower the number
29 Standard errors are generally 20% smaller with two-way clustering at the
MNE and country level. We therefore report the larger standard errors with
clustering at the MNE level.






































of quality-adjusted patent applications by around 10.94%.30 Evaluated
at the sample mean, this translates into an elasticity of quality-adjusted
patent output with respect to the B-index of −1.02 which is in the range
of prior findings (see, e.g., the literature review in Guceri and Liu,
2019).31
This result is corroborated in specification (A2), where we augment
the set of regressors by time-varying host country control variables
(GDP, GDP per capita, FDI and governance institutions) and specifi-
cation (A3) which, additionally, includes a control variable for gov-
ernments’ direct R&D support granted to the private sector. Similar
findings, emerge when regressors enter with a two-year and three-year
time lag, respectively, accounting for a potential time gap between
MNEs’ decisions to adjust their R&D investments (in the wake of R&D
tax reforms) and resulting changes in patent output (cf. specifications
(A4)-(A6) and (A7)-(A9)).
Panel B of Table 3 presents models that estimate Eq. (6) of Section 3.
In addition to the host country regressors, the specifications include re-
gressors for the average B-index and additional country characteristics
of other MNE group locations. The organization of the specifications
follows Panel A (with the modification that now both host country and
foreign location regressors are included). Several insights emerge. First,
the coefficient estimate for the host country B-index remains negative
and statistically significant but, in absolute terms, drops by around 16%
relative to the baseline models in Panel A (cf. specifications (A6) and
(B6)). This suggests that estimates for the host country tax effect are
biased when ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 is omitted, albeit in a quantitatively moderate way
(cf. our discussion in Section 3).
The results, moreover, suggest that R&D investment in a particular
location of an MNE group is also affected by changes in R&D tax costs in
other locations of the same MNE group. The coefficient estimate for the
?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 regressor is positive and quantitatively large in all specifications.
We note that the standard errors for the estimated coefficient of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡
decrease slightly when we increase the lag from one year to two and
three years. We interpret this as indicative of a random measurement
error in the dependent variable since actual R&D activity takes some
time to result in R&D output such that future R&D output is a more
precise measure of current R&D activity than current R&D output. The
random measurement error in the dependent variable increases the
share of unexplained variation in the regression and thus the magnitude
of the standard errors. Column (B6) of Table 3 shows that a 0.1-increase
in the average B-index in other MNE group locations raises the number
of quality-adjusted patent applications by 9.3%.32 This suggests that
MNEs reallocate R&D investments across group locations when tax
incentives change and that R&D activities in different locations act
as substitutes. The aggregate tax effect, i.e., the sum of the estimated
coefficients for the 𝑇𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 and ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 regressors, is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero in all specifications. Equi-sized reductions
in the B-index at all MNE locations are hence estimated to leave R&D
investments largely unaffected.
As tax effects are modeled as semi-elasticities in PPML estimation
and the identifying variation stems from unilateral tax reforms in
our setting (not simultaneous tax changes at all group affiliates), the
implied group-level investment response might nevertheless be non-
zero. If tax reforms, for example, systematically hit group locations
30 Noting the exponential form of the Poisson model’s conditional expec-





xp (−1.074 × 0.1) − 1 = 0.1094
31 Evaluated at the sample mean (0.928), a drop in the B-index by 0.1
orresponds to a relative change by 10.78%. Hence, we obtain an elasticity
f −10.94
10.78
= 1.01. In their literature overview, Guceri and Liu (2019) report
lasticities with respect to the cost of capital rather than the B-index. Note,
owever, that with little variation in interest and depreciation rates, the cost
f capital is largely a transformation of the B-index (see also our discussion of
his in Section 4).
32 I.e., exp 0.887 × 0.1 − 1 = 0.0928.10
( ) rof above average size, the estimates are consistent with a decline
(increase) in aggregate group-level investment when R&D tax costs rise
(fall).33 We draw on our estimates to simulate the effect of major R&D
ax reforms within our sample period (that is reforms that changed
he B-index by more than 0.1 and affected at least 50 MNEs in our
ample) on the aggregate number of granted patents by the MNEs in
ur data. The median of affected MNEs’ response to these reforms,
xpressed as a semi-elasticity, ranges from −0.22 to −0.03, supporting
he notion that firms’ overall global R&D investment hardly changes
hen R&D tax support at individual locations becomes more generous.
&D tax incentives are hence suggested to serve as beggar-thy-neighbor
nstruments rather than means to correct for MNEs’ underinvestment in
&D.
Note that, although less precisely estimated, the same pattern
merges for direct government support granted for business R&D
i.e., support not granted through the tax system). MNEs’ R&D invest-
ent is shown to increase (decrease) in the generosity of this support
n firms’ host countries (in other group locations of the same MNE
roup). This suggests that direct R&D subsidies, analogously to R&D
ax incentives, trigger cross-country reallocations of R&D activity.
Table 4 augments the vector of control variables by a full set of host
ountry-year-fixed effects (cf. Eq. (7) of Section 3). As described above,
he estimation strategy now compares changes in the R&D investment
f MNE group locations in the same country that belong to MNEs
hat are and are not subject to R&D tax cost shocks in other MNE
roup locations (or are subject to shocks of different size). This yields
oefficient estimates for the foreign B-index that are qualitatively and
uantitatively similar to the baseline findings in Table 3.
lacebo Test
Our setting, moreover, lends itself to a placebo test where we rees-
imate the baseline model after randomly reassigning group structures
cross firms. For each MNE group location in our data (comprising all
ffiliates belonging to the same MNE in a given country, cf. Section 4),
e randomly reassign which other affiliates abroad are part of the same
NE in order to simulate placebo values for the ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 and ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2
regressors. The placebo group structures abroad are drawn from all
MNEs which are present in the same country. An MNE’s group structure
abroad is treated as a cluster which is drawn as a whole. Drawing is
conducted without replacement and the drawn group structure abroad
is kept constant over time for a given entity.34
We repeat that procedure 5000 times. The distribution of the result-
ing coefficient estimates for the ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 regressor is depicted in Fig. 4.
The red line marks the coefficient estimate for ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 in specification
(B6) of Table 3. While the distribution is closely centered around zero,
the estimate is in the far right tail of the distribution. Note, moreover,
that under the null hypothesis that the true effect of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 is zero,
we obtain a two-sided 𝑝-value of 0.046 and hence reject the null. The
advantage of this hypothesis test (randomization inference, see Fisher,
33 To see this, consider the example of an MNE with two R&D locations that
file for 100 and 10 patents in the pre-reform period respectively. Assume that
the MNE experiences a B-index increase of 0.1 at the larger group location.
The semi-elasticity estimates in specification (B6) of Table 3 predict that
the number of patent applications drops by 8.64 applications in the policy-
changing jurisdiction and increases by 0.93 applications in the foreign country.
In consequence, the MNE’s aggregate group-level response to the tax reform, in
this example, is a reduction by 7.71 patent applications or 7.0% (=7.71/110).
34 Resampling group structures abroad only from MNEs, which have an
affiliate in the same country, allows us to test whether the results are driven
by common shocks to supra-national regions. Specifically, if the results were
driven by such shocks – i.e., if domestic and foreign locations were affected
by common regional factors that simultaneously altered R&D investment and
tax policies for all affiliates in the region – we would still expect to see
systematically positive coefficient estimates for the ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 regressor after the
andomization exercise.












Panel A (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) (A9)
B-index −1.074*** −0.963*** −1.027*** −1.181*** −1.040*** −1.073*** −0.889*** −0.784** −0.794**
(0.385) (0.332) (0.339) (0.330) (0.294) (0.300) (0.324) (0.308) (0.309)
Direct R&D Support 0.018* 0.027** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Number of observations 26,919 26,919 26,919 23,499 23,499 23,499 20,151 20,151 20,151
Number of group locations 2,793 2,793 2,793 2,680 2,680 2,680 2,539 2,539 2,539
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3
Control variables (Host) No Base All No Base All No Base All
Panel B (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9)
B-index −0.966*** −0.875*** −0.891*** −1.069*** −0.922*** −0.904*** −0.775** −0.646** −0.610**
(0.372) (0.316) (0.336) (0.308) (0.273) (0.288) (0.311) (0.298) (0.305)
Avg. Foreign B-index 0.770* 0.817** 0.869** 0.788** 0.862*** 0.887*** 0.771** 0.852*** 0.839***
(0.417) (0.379) (0.413) (0.327) (0.310) (0.333) (0.318) (0.309) (0.321)
Direct R&D Support 0.014 0.021* 0.022**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Avg. Foreign Direct R&D Support −0.017 −0.023* −0.026**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
Number of observations 26,919 26,919 26,919 23,499 23,499 23,499 20,151 20,151 20,151
Number of group locations 2,793 2,793 2,793 2,680 2,680 2,680 2,539 2,539 2,539
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3
Control variables (Host) No Base All No Base All No Base All
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable: the quality-adjusted patent counts. B-index indicates the
-index of the host country of a MNE group location in a given year. Avg. Foreign B-index indicates the average B-index in other MNE group locations. See the notes to Table 2 for
variable definition. All specifications account for a full set of year-fixed effects and group location-fixed effects. Specifications (A2), (B2), (A5), (B5), (A8) and (B8) furthermore
nclude control variables for host countries’ GDP, GDP per capita, FDI and governance institutions; in the models of Panel B (B2, B5 and B8), we also account for the average
f these control variables at foreign MNE group locations. Specifications (A3), (B3), (A6), (B6), (A9) and (B9), on top of that, include regressors for the direct government R&D
upport granted to businesses in the host country and, in the models of Panel B (B3, B6 and B9) additionally for the average of this variable in other MNE group locations. In
pecifications (A1)–(A3) and (B1)–(B3), all regressors enter with a one-year lag (𝑡 − 1), in specifications (A4)–(A6) and (B4)–(B6) with a two-year lag (𝑡 − 2) and in specifications
A7)–(A9) and (B7)–(B9) with a three-year lag (𝑡 − 3). Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.able 4
ountry-Year fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Avg. Foreign B-index 0.776* 0.778* 0.851** 0.758** 0.779*** 0.838*** 0.712** 0.749** 0.792**
(0.457) (0.400) (0.432) (0.335) (0.302) (0.321) (0.352) (0.333) (0.333)
Avg. Foreign Direct R&D Support −0.016 −0.021 −0.028**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Number of observations 26,772 26,772 26,772 23,417 23,417 23,417 20,078 20,078 20,078
Number of group locations 2,791 2,791 2,791 2,679 2,679 2,679 2,536 2,536 2,536
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 1 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3 𝑡 − 3
Control variables (Foreign) No Base All No Base All No Base All
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. The specifications correspond to the models estimated in Panel B of Table 3,
but additionally include a full set of country-year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.Table 5
Number of domestic inventors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
B-index −1.197*** −1.082*** −0.921** −0.775**
(0.414) (0.396) (0.363) (0.382)
Avg. Foreign B-index 0.701** 0.704** 0.760** 0.786**
(0.326) (0.341) (0.333) (0.339)
Direct R&D Support 0.035*** 0.029**
(0.012) (0.013)
Avg. Foreign Direct R&D Support −0.007 −0.003
(0.017) (0.018)
Number of observations 23,593 23,593 23,531 23,593 23,593 23,531
Number of group locations 2,690 2,690 2,689 2,690 2,690 2,689
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Control variables (Host) No No No All All All
Country-year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses.
Dependent variable: total number of inventors listed on the patent applications of a given group location in
period 𝑡. Specifications (1) and (4) correspond to the specifications (A4) and (A6) of Table 3. Specifications
(2) and (5) correspond to specifications (B4) and (B6) of Table 3, specifications account for country-year
fixed effects and correspond to specifications (4) and (6) in Table 4. Stars behind coefficients indicate the
significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.11









Further robustness checks I.
Sample EU All NACE All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B-index −0.816*** −0.945*** −0.751**
(0.306) (0.220) (0.310)
Avg. Foreign B-index 1.068*** 1.038*** 0.568** 1.175*** 1.150*** 0.599* 0.838*** 0.827***
(0.348) (0.325) (0.268) (0.367) (0.355) (0.313) (0.321) (0.315)
Number of observations 15,308 15,183 23,361 11,406 11,317 28,029 23,417 23,214
Number of group locations 1,752 1,751 2,677 1,300 1,297 3,298 2,679 2,671
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Industry-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No No No
Country-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes
NUTS2-Year FE No No No No No Yes No No
Control variables (Host+Foreign) All All All All All All All All
+ For. R&D + For. R&D
+ For. Pat.
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable: the quality-adjusted patent count of a MNE group location
in year 𝑡. The specifications include the full set of regressors outlined in Table 3 (see the notes to Table 3). Specifications (3) and (4) additionally include a full set of 2-digit
ndustry-year-fixed effects. Specification (6) additionally accounts for a full set of NUTS2 region-year-fixed effects. Specifications (7) and (8) additionally include regressors for the
verage aggregate R&D spending (as a % of GDP) in the host countries of foreign MNE group locations and the average aggregate number of patent applications of residents of
he host countries of the foreign MNE group locations. In specifications (1) and (2), the sample is restricted to group locations that belong to MNEs headquartered in Europe. In
pecifications (4) and (5), the sample is restricted to high-technology manufacturing industries as defined by Eurostat. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, *
0%, ** 5%, *** 1%.able 7
urther robustness checks II.
Sample All No group change All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
B-index −0.925*** −0.966*** −0.919*** −0.885***
(0.267) (0.269) (0.291) (0.295)
Avg. Foreign B-index 1.006*** 0.951*** 0.976*** 0.891***
(0.331) (0.322) (0.340) (0.333)
Avg. Foreign B-index (all affil.) 0.882** 0.820**
(0.369) (0.357)
Min. Foreign B-index 0.807*** 0.755***
(0.296) (0.278)
User cost of capital (UCC) −2.450***
(0.890)
Avg. Foreign UCC 3.019*** 2.806***
(1.003) (0.974)
Number of observations 23,499 23,417 23,499 23,417 20,159 20,072 23,499 23,417 23,442 23,365
Number of group locations 2,680 2,679 2,680 2,679 2,221 2,220 2,680 2,679 2,676 2,675
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control variables (Host+Foreign) All All All All All All All All All All
Weights Uniform Uniform Patents Patents Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable: quality-adjusted patent count of a MNE group location
in year 𝑡. The specifications include the full set of control variables outlined in Table 3. The Avg. Foreign B-index and all control variables for other MNE group locations are
calculated based on uniform weights in Specifications (1) and (2). In specifications (3) and (4), the weighting is based on the number of patents granted during the sample period.
Here all group locations with non-zero patents obtain non-zero weights (also those with incidental R&D, which are excluded in the baseline analysis, cf. Section 4). The weighting
is based on asset-weights in specifications (5) and (6). Specifications (1)–(4) and specifications (7)–(10) comprise the full sample while specifications (5) and (6) restrict the sample
to MNE affiliates that did not experience a change in the set of other MNE group locations (used for the calculation of 𝑇 𝑖;−𝑐;𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖;−𝑐;𝑡) during the sample period. Columns (7)
and (8) replace the average foreign B-index with its minimum. Specifications (9) and (10) replace the B-index with a User Cost of Capital measure that is calculated based on the
B-index, information on long-term interest rates and a depreciation rate of 30%. Avg. Foreign UCC is the asset-weighted average of the user cost of capital of foreign affiliates,
calculated as in Eq. (9). Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.1935 for the seminal work) is that it comes without assumptions on the
correlation structure of errors.
Robustness Checks
We run a number of robustness checks. First, Fig. 5 presents re-
sults from a distributed lag model, which includes leads and lags
of the average B-index in other MNE group locations: ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡+𝑠 with
𝑠 ∈ {−2,−1,… , 2}. Analogously to the specifications in Table 4, the
model, moreover, accounts for a full set of country-year-fixed effects.
Importantly, the figure indicates that changes in the average B-index
in other MNE group locations do not impact firms’ R&D activity in
years prior to the reform. In the parlance of standard difference-in-
differences analysis, this suggests that the common trend assumption
holds and R&D group locations that do and do not experience changes
in foreign entities’ R&D tax environments (or experience changes of
different sign and/or size) do not systematically differ in their R&D12trends prior to the reform. In line with intuition (see Section 3), the
results furthermore indicate that responses of corporate R&D activity,
as measured by corporate patent applications, emerge with a time lag.
A second robustness check follows up on our discussion in Sec-
tion 4, where we acknowledge that R&D is commonly proxied either
by output-related measures, like patent counts, or by input-related
measures like R&D expenditures in the existing literature. While our
baseline analysis relies on an output-related proxy, we assess the sensi-
tivity of our findings to using an input-related measure instead, namely
the number of inventors at a given MNE group location in a given
year. More precisely, we calculate for each location of the MNE group
in each year the number of inventor names on the patent documents
who are located in the same country as the applicants of these patents.
We disregard locations with incidental R&D – consistently defined as
locations where less than 10% of all of the MNE’s inventors are located
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Effect heterogeneity.
Panel A Distance Firm Size Forward Citations
CEM Match Unweighted CEM-weights Unweighted CEM-weights Unweighted CEM-weights
Sample Split, Med. Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12)
B-index −0.868*** −0.254 −0.872*** −0.254 −0.548 −0.910*** −0.556 −0.910*** −1.156*** −0.733* −1.218*** −0.733*
(0.303) (0.504) (0.306) (0.504) (0.381) (0.302) (0.512) (0.302) (0.254) (0.401) (0.274) (0.401)
Avg. Foreign B-index 1.112*** 0.339 1.072*** 0.339 0.223 0.973*** 0.495 0.973*** 0.643 0.990** 0.745 0.990**
(0.358) (0.532) (0.363) (0.532) (0.388) (0.364) (0.473) (0.364) (0.439) (0.394) (0.507) (0.394)
Number of observations 11,281 11,486 11,281 11,486 11,163 11,604 11,163 11,604 11,292 11,475 11,292 11,475
Number of group locations 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1,298 1298 1,298 1,298
Control variables All All All All All All All All All All All All
Reg. Lag 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Panel B Distance Firm Size Forward Citations
CEM Match Unweighted CEM-weights Unweighted CEM-weights Unweighted CEM-weights
Sample Split, Med. Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9) (B10) (B11) (B12)
Avg. Foreign B-index 1.066*** 0.135 1.028*** 0.135 0.047 0.890** 0.180 0.890** 0.581* 0.923** 0.657** 0.923**
(0.354) (0.514) (0.352) (0.514) (0.401) (0.353) (0.502) (0.353) (0.313) (0.386) (0.324) (0.386)
Number of observations 11,212 11,405 11,212 11,405 11,074 11,537 11,074 11,537 11,226 11,411 11226 11,411
Number of group locations 1,297 1,296 1,297 1,296 1,295 1,298 1,295 1,298 1,297 1,295 1,297 1,295
Control variables All All All All All All All All All All All All
Reg. Lag 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. Dependent variable: the quality-adjusted patent count of a multinational
group location in year 𝑡. Panel A shows models that reestimate the baseline regressions in Table 3, specification (B6) splitting the sample in group locations with a below and
above median geographic distance to other MNE group locations (specifications (A1)–(A4)); that belong to MNEs with below and above median R&D activities as measured by the
aggregate number of quality-adjusted patents during the sample period (specifications (A5)–(A8)); and group locations that belong to MNEs with patent forward citations below
and above the median, as measured by the average number of forward citations per granted patent (specifications (A9)–(A12)). Panel B reestimates specification (B6) of Table 4
for these subsamples. The row ‘‘CEM Match" indicates if regression weights are derived by coarsened exact matching. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.Table 9
Impact on group level patenting and tax payments.
Dependent variable Quality weighted patents ETR - STR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B-index −0.088 0.131***
(0.665) (0.047)
Min. B-index 0.103 0.064**
(0.300) (0.028)
Direct R&D Support 0.075*** 0.074*** −0.000 −0.000
(0.025) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 9,885 9,885 7,572 7,572
Number of group locations 1,114 1,114 1,084 1,084
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Control variables (Host) All All All All
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented
in parentheses. The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the total number
of quality adjusted patents filed by a given MNE in year 𝑡. In specifications (3) and (4),
the dependent variable is the difference of the MNE’s effective tax rate (i.e., the sum
of taxes paid relative to the total pretax profits of the group) and the average statutory
tax rate of the MNE. Observations are dropped if the effective tax rate is negative or
above 100% or if the multinational group reports losses before taxes in any of our
sample years. B-index denotes the average B-index of all affiliates of the MNE, lagged
by two years. Min. B-index is the smallest B-index across all group affiliates, lagged by
two years. The specifications include averages of each control variable that is included
in specification (B6) in Table 3. All specifications are run with country- and year-fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
– in the computation of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠. Reestimating our baseline model (see
specification (A6) and (B6) of Table 3 and specification (6) in Table 4)
with this modified R&D proxy yields qualitatively and quantitatively
very similar results (cf. Table 5). This is in line with prior evidence,
which finds that R&D tax elasticities are broadly similar when proxying
for R&D activity based on input and output-related R&D measures
(e.g., Dechezleprêtre et al., 2017).
In Table 6, we run robustness checks with respect to the sample
composition and add additional fixed effects and control variables.
As highlighted above, one particularity of the data is that, for global
MNE groups, we do not observe R&D activities outside Europe (cf. the13Fig. 4. Placebo Test. Notes: The graph depicts the distribution of coefficient estimates
for the ‘‘Avg Foreign B-index"-regressor ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−2 obtained in placebo tests where we
randomly reassign foreign MNE group structures across MNE group locations in the
same country before reestimating the model in specification (B6) of Table 3. The red
line indicates the actual coefficient estimate for the ‘‘Avg Foreign B-index"-regressor in
specification (B6) of Table 3.
data description in Section 4). Changes in the tax environment at non-
European R&D locations are hence disregarded in the calculation of
the average B-index. This implies that the coefficient estimate on the
average foreign tax regressor should be interpreted as cross-border tax
effect between European group locations.35 Specifications (1) and (2)
of Table 6 reestimate the baseline models (Column (B6) of Table 3 and
35 This interpretation relies on the assumption that R&D tax policies at non-
European group locations do not act as a confounder (i.e., that these policies
are uncorrelated with R&D tax environments/R&D investments at MNE group
locations in Europe). As the innovation-rich economies outside Europe hardly





















































Fig. 5. Distributed Lag Model. Notes: The graph depicts the coefficient estimates and
5% confidence intervals from a distributed lag model. The model regressors comprise
he first and second lead (𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 2) of the average B-index in other MNE group
ocations as well as the current period and first and second lag of this variable (𝑡, 𝑡+1
nd 𝑡 + 2). The model controls for a full set of host country-year-fixed effects.
olumn (6) of Table 4) in a sample of group locations that belong to
NEs headquartered in Europe, where all relevant R&D group locations
re observed. This leaves the estimated tax effects largely unchanged.
pecification (3) of Table 6 shows that the estimates are robust to
ugmenting the vector of regressors by a full set of 2-digit-NACE
ndustry-year-fixed effects, which absorb industry-specific shocks.36 The
ame holds true when the sample is restricted to firms that operate
n a homogeneous set of highly-innovative manufacturing industries,
s defined by Eurostat, cf. specifications (4) and (5) of Table 6. Spec-
fication (6) replaces the set of country-year-fixed effects with a set
f region-year-fixed effects, where regions are defined according to
ubnational NUTS 2 areas. This hedges against differential R&D time
rends at a refined subnational geographical level. The results resemble
he baseline estimates. Moreover, while the baseline models control
or economic and institutional changes in other MNE group locations
subsumed in the vector ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠 in Section 3), specifications (7) and (8)
urthermore augment the vector of control variables by country-level
&D trends in the host countries of foreign MNE locations. In specifi-
ation (7) (specification (8)), we add a regressor for R&D expenditure as
percentage of GDP (the number of resident-filed patent applications)
n the host countries of other MNE group locations, calculated as an
sset-weighted average analogously to (9). In both cases, the data
re drawn from the World Development Indicators. This modification
ields results similar to the baseline findings. Table A.4 furthermore
hows that accounting for firm productivity shocks in the host countries
f other entities of the same MNE group does not alter the baseline
esults either.
changed their R&D tax treatment during the sample period, we consider this
assumption to hold (the B-index for the U.S. remained unchanged during the
sample period; the B-index for Japan, Canada and Australia moved moderately
only with standard deviations of 0.048, 0.006 and 0.012, respectively during
the sample period). Note, moreover, that we present evidence for effect
heterogeneity below. Specifically, we show that firms’ R&D tax responsiveness
negatively correlates with intra-group distance and positively with MNE size.
The tax responsiveness of unobserved non-European R&D locations of the
sample MNEs might hence be larger or smaller than the estimated effect for
the set of European group locations (as non-European affiliates likely belong
to MNEs of above average size and with above average intra-group distance).
36 If group locations comprise firms with different 2-digit NACE codes, we
assign the most frequent industry. In case of multiple industries with the same
frequency, a NACE code is randomly drawn.14In Table 7, we assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
definition of the foreign tax regressor ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡. Specifications (1) and (2)
reestimate the baseline model with a foreign tax variable (and further
host country controls in other MNE group locations) that is calculated
based on uniform weights. Instead of disregarding locations with less
than 10% of all of the MNE’s granted patents when calculating ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡,
pecifications (3) and (4) average over all locations weighting by the
ocations share in all of the MNE’s granted patents over the complete
ample frame. Specifications (5) and (6), moreover, assess whether the
stimates are driven by changes in MNE group structures within the
ample period. As explained in Section 3, the baseline analysis accounts
or M&As and firm foundations when defining group structures at a
iven point in time. This adds precision to the estimation strategy as
roup locations enter the data when they are founded and firms are
eassigned to new owners at the time of mergers and acquisitions. How-
ver, it also implies that ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 may not only vary with country-level
&D tax reforms but also with choices of the MNE that alter the MNE
roup structure. Acknowledging potential endogeneity concerns related
o these choices, we rerun all model specifications in a subsample of
NE group locations for which the set of MNE group locations (used for
he calculation of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡) remains unchanged within the sample frame.
his ensures that time variation in ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 stems from tax reforms only.
his restriction reduces the number of MNE group locations by 500
ocations only, reflecting that firm foundations and acquisitions only
lter group structures if the incoming/exiting firm is the only group
ntity in the respective country; furthermore new firms with little R&D
ctivity do not enter the calculation of ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡 (cf. Section 4). Results
remain largely unchanged.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 7, we use the minimum foreign B-
index instead of a weighted average as explanatory variable of interest.
If R&D activities at alternative locations are perfect substitutes without
any further transactions costs, MNEs might first and foremost distort
R&D towards the location with the most favorable tax system. If that
held true, R&D allocation would be particularly sensitive to changes
in the minimum foreign B-index. However, the empirical estimates
imply quantitatively slightly weaker response rates for the minimum
B-index relative to the baseline analysis (although not significantly
different in a statistical sense). This may reflect the presence of trans-
action costs, including agency costs and other frictions within the firm
(e.g., see Williamson, 2000), which inhibit the emergence of corner
solutions where all R&D activity is located at the affiliate with the
lowest R&D costs. Transaction costs may also occur in the form of con-
vex adjustment costs, the convexity of which decreases in the level of
R&D input factors present at the alternative locations (e.g., see Bloom,
2007; Freeman and Van Reenen, 2009).
As an alternative to the B-index, we, moreover, use the user cost
for R&D capital as a measure of tax incentives in columns (9) and
(10) of Table 7. The user cost of R&D capital is computed as in Bloom
and Griffith (2001) and Wilson (2009). Following these papers we
assume a depreciation rate of 30% and use long-term interest rates
(i.e., interest rates on 10-year government bonds). Reassuringly, results
remain robust when using the user cost of capital as a tax incentive
measure with the larger coefficient resulting from the different scaling
of the explanatory variable.37 This indicates that it is variation in
foreign and domestic tax incentives rather than their interaction with
the general economic environment that drives the results.
Another concern is that because the B-index formula contains the
corporate income tax rate, variation in the tax incentive measure is
driven by variation in the tax rate rather than by variation in the
actual input incentives (e.g., tax credits, super-deductions, accelerated
37 The sample mean for the user cost of capital is 0.301 while it is 0.931
for the B-index. Note that, evaluated at the sample mean, the estimated own-
country R&D tax effect again translates into a tax elasticity well in the range
of the existing literature.
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depreciation). We address this concern in several analyses reported in
the (Table A.3). In particular, we first add both the domestic and the
average foreign statutory tax rate as additional control variables. We
repeat this exercise using the effective average tax rate (EATR) for R&D
as reported by Bösenberg and Egger (2017) instead of the statutory tax
rate. Finally, we separate the denominator and the numerator of the B-
index (see Eq. (8)) and add them separately as explanatory variables.
In all specifications the main effect remains robust with estimated coef-
ficients of similar magnitude as in the base analysis. Interestingly, the
coefficient for both the domestic and the foreign EATR is insignificant.
This points to MNEs adjusting R&D at the intensive margin and thus
responding to measures of marginal tax costs such as the B-index rather
than average tax rates such as measured by the EATR.
Also note that the analysis abstracts from so-called patent box
regimes. While R&D tax incentives are commonly designed as special
R&D tax deductions or R&D tax credits, a number of countries have
recently introduced patent boxes which grant special low tax rates on
patent income. Following the prior literature, the B-index definition
does not account for related provisions (see e.g., Bösenberg and Egger,
2017) as they largely serve as instruments to attract mobile shifting
income rather than to foster R&D investment (cf. e.g., Alstadsæter
et al., 2018; Koethenbuerger et al., 2018; Knoll and Riedel, 2019
and Schwab and Todtenhaupt, 2021; see also footnote 5). Dropping
MNEs connected to countries which introduced patent box regimes
during the sample period, does not change the estimates for the B-index
regressors (reestimating specification (6) of Table 4, e.g., yields a coef-
ficient estimate for the ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠-regressor of 1.108 which is statistically
significant at the 5% level). Analogously, we find results comparable to
the baseline estimates when we augment the set of regressors by control
variables for patent box regimes in the group location’s host country
and at foreign locations (reestimating specification (6) of Table 4,
e.g., yields a coefficient estimate for the ?̄?𝑖,−𝑐,𝑡−𝑠-regressor of 0.903,
which is statistically significant at the 5% level).
Response Heterogeneity
Next, we examine response heterogeneity. Our theoretical consider-
ations in Section 2 suggest that the substitutionary link between R&D
investments at MNE group locations, identified in the prior analysis,
may correlate with geographic distance and the size of R&D activities.
In the empirical analysis to come, the former is measured by the asset-
weighted average distance of a group location to all foreign R&D hosts
within the MNE; the latter is captured by the MNEs’ aggregate quality-
adjusted number of patent applications over the full sample period.
Moreover, we test whether a complementary link between group loca-
tions’ R&D investments, while rejected in the full sample, may emerge
for subsets of firms. To do so, we identify MNEs that file for patents
that receive many forward citations. As forward citations indicate that
corporate R&D activities yield innovations that serve as basis for future
R&D, R&D investments in these companies are particularly likely to be
shaped by knowledge spillovers that establish a complementary R&D
investment link (see Section 2).
The first two columns of Panel A in Table 8 test for response het-
erogeneity in the distance dimension and rerun the baseline model in
subsamples of group locations with below and above median distance
to foreign R&D locations, respectively. The estimated tax effects are
economically and statistically more significant in the subsample of
entities that are located in geographic proximity to other affiliates
of the same MNE group (column (A1)). This holds true for the host
country tax effect as well as for the foreign location tax effect. The
aggregate tax effect, as measured by the sum of the coefficient esti-
mates is close to zero and statistically insignificant in both subsamples.
This suggests that R&D tax responses are driven by cross-border R&D
relocation in both sets of firms but that effects are stronger for MNEs
characterized by small geographic intra-firm distances between R&D
locations. Specifications (A3) and (A4) assess whether this finding is15
driven by other imbalances between the subsamples of high-distance aand low-distance firms. One might, for example, presume that firms
with higher intra firm distance to other group affiliates belong to larger
MNEs; if size determines firms’ tax responsiveness, related effects might
be picked up in the analysis. The models in specifications (A3) and
(A4) employ Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM, see Iacus et al., 2012)
to absorb heterogeneity in MNEs’ aggregate R&D size and the average
number of forward citations per patent. The covariates are coarsened in
5 equi-sized bins each and MNE locations with below and above median
distance to foreign R&D hosts are exactly matched on the coarsened
data. This provides matching weights for the subsequent regression.
The estimates obtained from this specification resemble the results
obtained from regressions based on unweighted data.38
Specifications (A5) and (A6) test for response heterogeneity be-
tween MNE groups with small and large aggregate R&D activities,
respectively. Splitting the sample at the median of the MNEs’ aggregate
quality-adjusted count of granted patent applications shows that tax
response rates are significantly larger, in absolute terms, for MNEs with
above average R&D activity. This result is confirmed in specifications
using CEM weights to account for imbalances of covariates in the
sample split (cf. specifications (A7) and (A8)). Note, moreover, that
two of the sample countries, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
differentiated their R&D tax incentive schemes between large and small
(profitable) firms during the sample period. While all specifications
presented so far have accounted for large firms’ tax incentives in these
cases, modeling the small firm incentives instead yields comparable
results (not reported).
Finally, we determine whether a complementary link between loca-
tions’ R&D investments, while rejected in the full sample, may emerge
for subsets of firms.39 In specifications (A9) and (A10), we reestimate
the baseline model in subsamples of group locations that belong to
MNEs that, within the sample frame, file for patents with an above
and below median number of patent forward citations. The results
show similar coefficient estimates in the two subsamples. This finding is
confirmed in CEM specifications (i.e., specifications (A11) and (A12)).
All results in our heterogeneity analysis are robust to including
the full set of country-year-fixed effects (see Panel B of Table 8).
Concluding, the results in this subsection suggest that it is mainly
firms with large overall R&D activities and firms with small intra-
firm distances between R&D locations that relocate R&D activity in
response to changes in R&D tax incentives. The latter finding supports
recent macro-level studies which assume R&D mobility (in response
to tax changes) to decline in space (see the literature review in the
introduction). The former finding provides a rationale for conditioning
R&D tax design on the size of firms’ R&D activities.
6. Implications and discussion
The evidence provided in this study indicates that MNEs reallocate
R&D across borders when R&D tax incentives change, implying that
R&D investments at different MNE group locations act as substitutes. It
follows that the global response of MNEs’ R&D activity to changes in
R&D tax incentives is smaller than the response in the policy-changing
country. In fact, our estimates suggest that MNEs hardly raise their
global R&D activity at all when R&D tax costs fall. To further check
if this is indeed the case, we reestimate the global tax effect with con-
solidated group-level data. Specifically, we aggregate the MNEs’ R&D
activity (as measured by quality-weighted granted patent applications)
38 Coarsened Exact Matching does not only account for imbalance in means,
but also for imbalances in higher moments and interactions. Note that the bin-
ning strategy implies that the variables’ 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles
separate the bins.
39 Bilir and Morales (2020) show that innovations at one MNE group location
increase the productivity of entities of the same MNE group in other locations.
hey, however, do not test for a complementary link between R&D investments
t different group locations or for effects related to R&D tax incentives.


















across all locations and regress it on the average R&D tax costs of R&D
active affiliates, a full set of MNE group-fixed effects as well as the
average time-varying host country controls. The overall effect of the
average B-index on R&D at the group level is estimated to be close
to zero and turns out statistically insignificant (see specification (1) of
Table 9). Similar results are obtained when using the minimum tax cost
in the group (see specification (2) of Table 9). This supports the notion
that R&D tax incentives are hardly instrumental in expanding aggregate
group-level R&D.
R&D tax subsidies thus appear to create significant windfall gains for
MNEs. To inquire if MNEs indeed benefit from a reduced tax burden,
we repeat the previous two regressions but the dependent variable is
substituted by the difference between the MNE’s effective tax rate –
i.e., the sum of taxes paid relative to total pretax profits – and the
MNE’s average statutory tax rate. The significant coefficient estimates
in specification (3) and (4) of Table 9 imply that lower R&D tax
costs, as measured by the B-index, are indeed associated with lower
effective tax rates at the MNE group level. The reduced overall tax
bill may ultimately benefit various stakeholders of the MNE. Prior
evidence suggests that reduced tax payments lead to higher payouts
(e.g., see Blouin and Krull, 2009; Dharmapala et al., 2011). Other stake-
holders’ compensation might adjust as well, including CEO’s salaries
and workers’ wages. There is also evidence that firms use tax savings
to supplement precautionary cash holdings (e.g. Guenther et al., 2020).
If firms are credit constrained, they might, on top of that, use the free
cash flow to raise capital investment and employment.40 This is in line
with the negative correlation between the average level of the B-index
(lagged by two years) and the two year growth rate in the number of
employees in our data (Fig. A.4).
While our evidence attenuates hopes that R&D tax incentives trigger
significant expansions of MNEs’ global R&D activity, this does not
necessarily mean that such tax subsidies are undesirable from a social
perspective. If R&D tax incentives are instrumental in raising the R&D
activity of domestic firms (which are, among others, more likely to
be credit-constrained than large multinational entities), their overall
welfare effect may be positive. Smaller firms frequently have the largest
relative demand for capital but information asymmetries and a lack
of collateral – in particular in the knowledge-intensive industries –
inhibit the acquisition of external funds, in particular debt financing
(Brown et al., 2012; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Colombo and Grilli,
2007; Freel, 2007; Hsu, 2004). Consistent with more binding financial
constraints, R&D investments by small firms exhibit a stronger response
to tax incentives than R&D investments by large firms (Castellacci
and Lie, 2015; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012). Hence, focusing funds on
smaller firms by capping the absolute value of R&D tax incentives is
an attractive policy option, which curbs the ‘‘crowding out’’ effect for
larger firms without impeding firm growth at particular size thresh-
olds.41 Nevertheless, R&D tax incentives for large MNEs might still be
efficiency enhancing despite lacking an apparent effect on aggregate
R&D. In particular, locations with a relative cost advantage in R&D
tasks in the global production process may be the ones to introduce
attractive tax incentives for R&D. Jointly, these benefits may then
outweigh adjustment costs which may otherwise inhibit an efficient
reallocation of R&D production tasks in the global production network.
Similar effects might emerge through repercussions of R&D output
within MNEs’ global value chain. Such repercussions could depend on
the geographic proximity of R&D activities to other operating entities,
40 A thorough empirical assessment of these response margins to changes
n R&D tax incentives is a fruitful avenue for future research. Among other
actors, the eventual use of funds will depend on the type of owners and
nstitutional parameters like dividend tax rates and wage tax rates.
41 Additionally, smaller firms are also found to benefit from direct R&D
ubsidies (Howell, 2017) and direct R&D subsidies can amplify the effect of16
&D tax incentives (Bérubé and Mohnen, 2009; Neicu et al., 2016).e.g. manufacturing sites. This may be the case if knowledge spillovers
decline in space or with cultural distance. Then, R&D relocations that
alter the geography of intra-firm R&D may trigger adjustments in firm
productivity and income.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically assess the impact of R&D tax incentives
on the R&D investment of multinational firms. Using rich unconsoli-
dated data on MNEs’ R&D activities, we replicate prior findings and
show that more generous input-related R&D tax incentives such as
tax credits, accelerated depreciation or super-deductions are associated
with higher R&D investments of MNE groups in the policy-changing
country. Our findings, however, also suggest that R&D investments at
locations abroad decline, pointing to intra-firm R&D relocation between
R&D hubs. The aggregate tax incentive effect, i.e., the sum of the
host and foreign country tax effect, turns out to be small and not
statistically different from zero. This suggests that MNEs respond to
R&D tax incentives by relocating R&D activity across group locations
rather than by increasing their aggregate R&D investments.
This has important policy implications. First, input-related R&D
tax incentives are found to serve as beggar-thy-neighbor instruments,
which may exert negative externalities on foreign jurisdictions. This
renders decentralized R&D tax policy setting inefficient and points to
potential welfare gains from policy coordination. Second, the findings
suggest that MNEs do not significantly raise their aggregate R&D in
response to more generous R&D tax support. The analysis hence casts
doubts on the effectiveness of these instruments in alleviating MNEs’
underinvestment in R&D.
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able A.1
orrelation between patent output and R&D expenditure.
Specification Adjustment of Variables 𝜌
(1) None 0.889***
(2) Scaling by GDP 0.688***
(3) Country fixed effects 0.815***
(4) Country-year fixed effects 0.779***
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficient 𝜌 between national patent
output and corporate R&D expenditure in OECD countries for the years 1981 to 2012
based on official OECD data. The reported correlation coefficient in line (1) uses non-
adjusted values for patent output and R&D expenditure. In line (2), both patent output
and R&D expenditure are divided by GDP prior calculation of 𝜌. In lines (3) and (4),
patent output and R&D expenditure are demeaned using fixed effects methodology to
absorb country fixed effects (3) and country-year fixed effects (4), respectively. Patent
output refers to the total count of patents in a country for given year. R&D expenditure
refers to the sum of corporate R&D expenditures in a country for a given year. Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Sample restrictions.
Panel A Less than 9 locations Sample years 2000–2010
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
B-index −1.403*** −1.273*** −1.325*** −0.999*** −0.840*** −0.759***
(0.283) (0.224) (0.222) (0.267) (0.208) (0.205)
Direct R&D Support 0.034*** 0.032**
(0.010) (0.013)
Number of observations 22,282 22,282 22,282 17,547 17,547 17,547
Number of group locations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,487 2,487 2,487
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Control variables (Host) No Base All No Base All
Panel B (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
B-index −1.288*** −1.168*** −1.222*** −0.879*** −0.636*** −0.564***
(0.274) (0.222) (0.220) (0.257) (0.206) (0.205)
Avg. Foreign B-index 0.554** 0.701** 0.640** 0.751** 0.722** 0.641**
(0.280) (0.279) (0.294) (0.319) (0.346) (0.320)
Direct R&D Support 0.030*** 0.026**
(0.010) (0.012)
Avg. Foreign Direct R&D Support −0.003 −0.022
(0.010) (0.017)
Number of observations 22,282 22,282 22,282 17,547 17,547 17,547
Number of group locations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,487 2,487 2,487
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Control variables (Host) No Base All No Base All
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses. The specifications (A1)–(A3) and (B1)–
(B3) reestimate specifications (A4)–(A6) and (B4)–(B6) in Table 3, but exclude outliers in terms of group size: only MNEs with less than nine
locations are included in the sample. Columns (A4)–(A6) and (B4)–(B6) run the same regressions from Table 3 for the (restricted) sample period
2000–2010. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.Table A.3
Alternative measures of R&D Tax incentives.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
B-index −1.030*** −0.728**
(0.230) (0.326)
Avg. Foreign B-index 0.876** 0.821** 0.971*** 0.844**
(0.355) (0.338) (0.353) (0.340)
B-index adj. −1.473***
(0.336)
Avg. Foreign B-index adj. 1.161** 1.084**
(0.511) (0.497)
Corporate Tax Rate (CTR) −1.208*
(0.700)
Avg. Foreign CTR −0.502 −0.192
(0.886) (0.805)
Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) −0.902
(0.755)
Avg. Foreign EATR −0.218 −0.025
(0.975) (0.880)
1∕(1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅) −1.016***
(0.269)
Avg. Foreign 1∕(1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅) 0.118 0.198
(0.427) (0.392)
Number of observations 23,499 23,417 23,499 23,417 23,499 23417
Number of group locations 2,680 2,679 2,680 2,679 2,680 2,679
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Control variables (Host+Foreign) All All All All All All
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in parentheses.
Dependent variable: the quality-adjusted patent count of a MNE group location in year 𝑡. The specifications
include the full set of control variables outlined in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) (colums (3) and (4)) include
the corporate tax rate (the effective average tax rate) as an additional control variable. Columns (5) and (6)
decompose the B-index as follows: B-index adjusted denotes the B-index multiplied by the net of corporate
tax rate (1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅). The inverse of (1 − 𝐶𝑇𝑅) is also included. Avg. Foreign CTR, Avg. Foreign B-index adj.,
Avg. Foreign 1∕(1−𝐶𝑇𝑅) are asset-weighted averages, calculated as in (9). Stars behind coefficients indicate
the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.17
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Avg. Foreign B-index 0.922*** 0.910***
(0.309) (0.314)
Number of observations 16,396 16,361
Number of group locations 2,071 2,070
Lag structure of regressors 𝑡 − 2 𝑡 − 2
Country-Year FE No Yes
Control variables (Host+Foreign) All All
+ Profitability + Profitability
Foreign Country Foreign Country
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at the MNE group level) are presented in
parentheses. The specifications in this table reestimate the baseline models in Column
(A6) and (B6) of Table 3 but include an additional control variable for the average
pre-tax profitability, measured as pre-tax profits over shareholders’ funds, of firms in the
host countries of the foreign MNE group locations. The variable is constructed based
on firm-level data in Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database (drawing on firms with
balanced unconsolidated accounting information between 2002 and 2012). Outliers are
winsorized at the 5% level and the firm set for the calculation is restricted to national
entities. This implies that none of the sample firms enters this calculation. We then
determine firms’ average pre-tax profitability in country-year cells. To absorb potential
shocks to firm profitability in the host countries of the other group locations that belong
to the same MNE as the group location under consideration, the asset-weighted average
is calculated following Eq. (9). Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level,
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Fig. A.1. Total number of domestic patent applications in the estimation sample. Notes:
This graph displays the evolution of the total number of patent applications filed by
MNEs in the estimation sample over time.18Fig. A.3. B-index in 2012 (if > 0.95) and # of B-index-Changes in Sample Period.
Notes: The graph is an extension to Fig. 3 in the main text. It depicts the 2012-value
of the B-index for countries with a B-index above 0.95 as well as the number of B-index
changes during the sample period exceeding 0.01 (in absolute terms) experienced by
these countries. Note that none of the depicted sample countries experienced a B-index
change larger than 0.05.Fig. A.2. Share of patent applications from 2005 that are granted in a given year after application. Notes: This graph displays the percentage of eventually granted patent
applications filed in 2005 that is granted in each year following the application. It does so for patents filed by applicants from all countries as well as separately for patents filed
by applicants from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104326B. Knoll et al.Fig. A.4. Binned Scatter Plot of Two-year Employment Growth and B-index. Notes: The
graph displays a binned scatter plot for the relative change of average employment two
years after the observed value of the B-index. We use the binscatter program published
by Michael Stepner. The plot is created by first regressing the relative change of average
employment in all MNE affiliates during the last two years on the B-index lagged by
two years as well as year and MNE fixed effects. The sample restriction is the same
as in the specifications of Table 9. We have further excluded outliers with an extreme
employment growth (i.e., the top percentile). The B-index is grouped into 10 equal-sized
bins and the mean of the average employment growth is computed for each bin and
displayed as a scatter plot. The best fit from an OLS regression is plotted as a red line.
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